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Sorry, I have to interject with a question: how good would Sealion's chances been if...

A) the Russians and Americans had stayed out of the war until later on?

or,

B) Chain Home had been disabled?

Tsukiyumi wrote:A) the Russians and Americans had stayed out of the war until later on?

Nonexistent. Don't forget that the period we're talking about is just after the fall of France, right at the start of the period when we only had a quarter of the planet on our side, rather than the vast majority of it.

B) Chain Home had been disabled?

Again, nonexistent. The Germans would have a much better chance of forcing a strategic withdrawal to 12 Group, but as I've been pointing out the plan was so shit that resistance would have to have been literally nonexistent for it to stand any chance of success.

Deepcrush wrote:The issue for the invasion is that as soon as said Armor moves more then 60 miles inland, they are now at the mid range of the RAF and thus targets for the RAF.

How exactly are they going to get 60 miles inland? Even assuming that the barges a) don't get swamped as soon as they leave port and b) survive the RAF and the RN, they've still got to go back across the Channel to collect follow-up forces, fuel, ammunition, etc. They will suffer losses on each trip, ultimately leaving the forces ashore hungry, immobile and helpless.

This would have led to a cut off as soon as the US joined the war, a Dunkirk for the Germans. As the addition of US air forces (or even just US supplied aircraft) too the RAF would have easily destroyed any standing Armor.

US aid was completely unnecessary to defeat any attempted German invasion.

However as Dowding pointed out to Churchill, the survival of the RAF equaled the survival of England.

Dowding had to assume the Germans knew what they were doing. Post-war evidence demonstrates that they didn't.

I have to disagree that the RN could withstand the continued attack of the Luftwaffe in order to engage the German landing forces. Considering that the RN would have to start out of range of the Luftwaffe then attempt to close range and engage.

They would certainly have suffered losses, but nowhere near 100%. I think you're underestimating the difficulty of trying to hit a fast, manoeuvering ship, especially when you've got enemy fighters launching spoiling attacks.

The problem is simply that the Germans needed to clear the skies, even landing 140,000 troops is meaningless if the armor they bring with them is being slammed by 2000lbs bombs by the air.

They needed to completely clear both the skies and the seas. If they failed either requirement then the invasion fleet would be slaughtered.

The key would be using the RN to block the future withdraw of German forces as they try to flee back across the Channel. After the Luftwaffe has been bled out and after the US is actively in the war.

Again, you're massively overestimating the Germans' ability to get ashore and keep their forces supplied. US aid would have been completely unnecessary to smash the invasion.

Also the cost to the RN to engage during the invasion rather then a year later would have been a waste of naval support that the UK didn't need to expend.

If the Germans had been able to stay ashore for a year, they would almost certainly have won - it would have meant that they'd taken a major port, and were bringing supplies in fast enough to sustain their forces. The UK forces available in 1940 wouldn't have been able to resist the forces the Germans had available. The Germans' problem was that they couldn't get ashore in numbers, and couldn't sustain those they could. However, the reason they couldn't do so was because of the combined efforts of the RAF and the Navy, predominately the latter. Removing either of those factors would have made it easier for them, which was a risk that simply couldn't afford to be taken.

Sorry for the delay in response.

Captain Seafort wrote:How exactly are they going to get 60 miles inland? Even assuming that the barges a) don't get swamped as soon as they leave port and b) survive the RAF and the RN, they've still got to go back across the Channel to collect follow-up forces, fuel, ammunition, etc. They will suffer losses on each trip, ultimately leaving the forces ashore hungry, immobile and helpless.

Southern England is rather easy ground for armor and troops to cross, 60miles isn't really hard for a force to transit. Considering the lack of effective English defenses, wouldn't be hard for the distance to be covered in just a matter of a few days.

Captain Seafort wrote:US aid was completely unnecessary to defeat any attempted German invasion.

That would be true, if the RAF was double its size and the RN wasn't spread out around the world and the British islands had the a matching number of troops to the Germans. However none of this was the case.

Captain Seafort wrote:Dowding had to assume the Germans knew what they were doing. Post-war evidence demonstrates that they didn't.

Incorrect, your post war opinion would like to pretend such, however the post war experts have openly stated Dowding to have been correct in his warnings and actions.

Captain Seafort wrote:They would certainly have suffered losses, but nowhere near 100%. I think you're underestimating the difficulty of trying to hit a fast, manoeuvering ship, especially when you've got enemy fighters launching spoiling attacks.

I never said anything about 100%, not that such losses would matter. The RAF was outnumbered 3:2 in the air, so engaging in central airspace would have meant giving the air power advantage to the Germans. Which would have destroyed the RAF, which as Dowding pointed out would have allowed for an invasion of England itself.

Captain Seafort wrote:They needed to completely clear both the skies and the seas. If they failed either requirement then the invasion fleet would be slaughtered.

And of course if the RN and RAF had been commited to an engagement over the channel, the Germans could have gained such.

Captain Seafort wrote:Again, you're massively overestimating the Germans' ability to get ashore and keep their forces supplied. US aid would have been completely unnecessary to smash the invasion.

Getting ashore is easy, its the supplies that are the problem. The Germans never had an issue with getting troops on English soil, the problem had always been feeding them once there.

Captain Seafort wrote: If the Germans had been able to stay ashore for a year, they would almost certainly have won - it would have meant that they'd taken a major port, and were bringing supplies in fast enough to sustain their forces. The UK forces available in 1940 wouldn't have been able to resist the forces the Germans had available. The Germans' problem was that they couldn't get ashore in numbers, and couldn't sustain those they could. However, the reason they couldn't do so was because of the combined efforts of the RAF and the Navy, predominately the latter. Removing either of those factors would have made it easier for them, which was a risk that simply couldn't afford to be taken.

Its unlikely that any amount of time, be it a day or year would have won England for the Germans. Unlike most of Europe, England's ability to fight wasn't based on its home soil. So the ability of the British Empire to continue fighting even with the home islands under attack would have inflicted an unsustainable toll on the Germans.

Deepcrush wrote:Southern England is rather easy ground for armor and troops to cross, 60miles isn't really hard for a force to transit.

For a force with vehicles, fuel, food, ammunition and no resistance, this is true. For a German invasion during the Second World War, it's impossible.

Considering the lack of effective English defenses

Other than the most extensive complex of field and fixed fortifications outside the Rhineland.

US aid was completely unnecessary to defeat any attempted German invasion.

That would be true, if the RAF was double its size and the RN wasn't spread out around the world and the British islands had the a matching number of troops to the Germans. However none of this was the case.

All the RAF had to do was disrupt LW attacks on the RN's destroyers, which would themselves simply have to sail up and down in front of the landing barges. End of invasion.

Incorrect, your post war opinion would like to pretend such, however the post war experts have openly stated Dowding to have been correct in his warnings and actions.

Post war experts (i.e. a Staff College exercise based on Sealion, conducted by the best senior officers in the British and German armies) expected that the Germans would be reduced to trying to evacuate what was left of the landing force within a few days.

I never said anything about 100%, not that such losses would matter. The RAF was outnumbered 3:2 in the air, so engaging in central airspace would have meant giving the air power advantage to the Germans. Which would have destroyed the RAF, which as Dowding pointed out would have allowed for an invasion of England itself.

Bollocks. 3:2 disadvantage would have been more than sufficient to disrupt LW attacks on the RN. End of invasion.

And of course if the RN and RAF had been commited to an engagement over the channel, the Germans would have been salughtered[/quoted]

Fixed for you.

Getting ashore is easy

Dead bodies floating ashore face-down tend to be rather ineffective combatants, and that's the only way the vast majority of the Sealion invasion force would have reached the beaches.

For a force with vehicles, fuel, food, ammunition and no resistance, this is true. For a German invasion during the Second World War, it's impossible.

I know you would like to think so, however reality doesn't agree.

Other than the most extensive complex of field and fixed fortifications outside the Rhineland.

Undermanned and underequipped, not impressive.

All the RAF had to do was disrupt LW attacks on the RN's destroyers, which would themselves simply have to sail up and down in front of the landing barges. End of invasion.

This would be a very cute theory if it didn't require the GHSF to not open fire or for the out numbered RAF to be able to engage an equal number of LW aircraft and all none engaged LW fighters to be sporting and turn back to France. However, in a real engagement people aren't likely to play up to your ego of England or ignorance of an active battlefield.

Post war experts (i.e. a Staff College exercise based on Sealion, conducted by the best senior officers in the British and German armies) expected that the Germans would be reduced to trying to evacuate what was left of the landing force within a few days.

Would these be the same pretend experts that told you that Germany planned to use flat bottom tugs and barges... and not the blue water craft they used for a similar but longer reached operation too Finland? Somehow I just can't bring myself to call a bunch of kids on wiki to be experts...

Bollocks. 3:2 disadvantage would have been more than sufficient to disrupt LW attacks on the RN. End of invasion.

Of course, because as everyone knows the similar disadvantage the RAF is suffering being similar to that of the IJN and everyone also knows that the IJN was fully able to avoid their navy going to the bottom of the Pacific Ocean...

But on the serious side, the IJN was destroyed, their aircraft were unable to effectively engage the USN's aircraft in a way to disrupt the sinking of the IJN. The same problem applies to the RAF. Again, this points back to the need of preserving RAF in fighting strength as the RN was simiply to weak to counter the German forces as a whole.

Dead bodies floating ashore face-down tend to be rather ineffective combatants, and that's the only way the vast majority of the Sealion invasion force would have reached the beaches.

Or so you would like to pretend.

Deepcrush wrote:Undermanned and underequipped, not impressive.

Manning was never a problem, equipment was back up to strength by late summer, and the stop lines, especially the GHQ line were far more impressive than anything the Germans had successfully faced.

This would be a very cute theory if it didn't require the GHSF

The what?

for the out numbered RAF to be able to engage an equal number of LW aircraft and all none engaged LW fighters to be sporting and turn back to France.

Who says they need an equal number to be successful - they just need to break up the attacks.

Would these be the same pretend experts that told you that Germany planned to use flat bottom tugs and barges

No - that came from the German plan for Sealion.

But on the serious side, the IJN was destroyed, their aircraft were unable to effectively engage the USN's aircraft in a way to disrupt the sinking of the IJN. The same problem applies to the RAF. Again, this points back to the need of preserving RAF in fighting strength as the RN was simiply to weak to counter the German forces as a whole.

I assume you're talking about Midway. There are a couple slight problems - the RN had far more destroyers on hand than the IJN had carriers and destroyers are far more manoeuvrable than carriers. Therefore the task of defending them is far easier. All the destroyers then needed to do was sail up and down in front of the barges and they'd be swamped. End of invasion.

thelordharry wrote:I'm not sure if any of you know about this but there's an account on Twitter that's 'live tweeting' events from 1939 as though they're realtime. It's from a British perspective.

https://twitter.com/#!/realtimewwII

It's a novel idea and the project will conclude in six years time, mirroring the end of the war.

Today sees the live tweeting of the events of the Battle of the River Plate

There's also one from a US perspective:

https://twitter.com/#!/realtimeww2

I followed them and then was asked to follow the italian tweets of wwii