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Seeing that building a flank balanced barge was the worse of the problems the Germans had to face with Sealion. Wouldn't have taken long for them to over come that issue.

Deepcrush wrote:Seeing that building a flank balanced barge was the worse of the problems the Germans had to face with Sealion. Wouldn't have taken long for them to over come that issue.

Sealion didn't involve building anything - it involved commandeering Rhine barges and performing the idiotic carousel I described.

Which would have failed in op-prep and would have been easily corrected afterwards. Sealion was still a far better option in the end. The invasion of Russia would have been better off waiting while Germany put England under heel.

Deepcrush wrote:Which would have failed in op-prep and would have been easily corrected afterwards.

Corrected with what? They weren't planning on using Rhine barges because of their suitability for the role - they knew they were crap. They were using them because they didn't have any other option. They were trying to do on a shoestring, at a few weeks notice, without air superiority and with no navy to speak of, what the allies did after two years of preparation, with the full might of US industry behind them, complete air superiority and a sizeable chunk of the two most powerful navies on the planet in support.

Sealion was still a far better option in the end.

Bollocks was it. The outcome to launching Sealion would have been a massacre - most of the assault force would have floated ashore face-down and the survivors could have been mopped up by the Home Guard and the local plod.

The invasion of Russia would have been better off waiting while Germany put England under heel.

They would have been waiting for a very long time - the fortifications of the south cost of England have been been built up over a thousand years. Even a competently planned, well-supported operation would have found it a very tough nut to crack even without the various stop lines built in 1940. In any event, waiting and planning something sane means that we're no longer talking about Sealion.

P1, Once again I will point out that the soft water barges would have failed in op-prep and to continue the invasion would have required the fielding of a better craft. Also again I'll point out that's a rather easy fix. Hard water barges can built on a farm, seen that around here and it will always be a funny sight, when the need arises. The RN spread around he world getting itself hammered with the channel easily blocked with a few squadrons of U-boats.

P2, the whole twenty functional divisions that England could field at the time vs the fresh seventy that Germany could field. The homeguard and local police... A joke without US reinforcements. Over reached from fighting a dozen conflicts around the world and lossing. The likely massacre would have been the English population.

P3, high standing stone forts vs the armed forces of 1941 Germany? I get there is an extreme of English ego at the loin of Sealion, but to say that a couple of forts on open ground would somehow aid the English defenders is a joke. It would have done nothing but put the Royal forces in preset target areas. The defenses of England were built to defend against guys with swords and even then, they failed most of the time. Normans, Saxons, Angs, Vikings, etc... Had plenty of fun walking ashore old england.

Summary remains the same, Sealion simply needed a little time to figure a safe landing plan. After that, England would have been the slaughter house that Russia turned out to be.

Deepcrush wrote:Once again I will point out that the soft water barges would have failed in op-prep and to continue the invasion would have required the fielding of a better craft.

Correct. This is the point I'm trying to make - the whole plan was suicidal.

Also again I'll point out that's a rather easy fix. Hard water barges can built on a farm, seen that around here and it will always be a funny sight, when the need arises.

Then why didn't the Germans do so? The answer: they couldn't. Even for the allies, landing craft were an extremely scarce and valuable resource, to the extent that we had to move them around between the Med and the Channel in order to conduct our various operations.

The RN spread around he world getting itself hammered with the channel easily blocked with a few squadrons of U-boats.

Submarines could certainly sink a few ships, but there's no way in hell they could have kept the Home Fleet's destroyer squadrons out of the Channel - they'd've run the gauntlet, soaked up their losses, and then steamed up and down sinking the invasion force at will.

the whole twenty functional divisions that England could field at the time vs the fresh seventy that Germany could field.

No, the half dozen decently equipped divisions the UK could field vs the zero divisions the Germans could get across the Channel.

P3, high standing stone forts vs the armed forces of 1941 Germany? I get there is an extreme of English ego at the loin of Sealion, but to say that a couple of forts on open ground would somehow aid the English defenders is a joke.

They were designed to withstand Napoleonic artillery - primitive, but still powerful. Holding off MG 34s would have been easy.

they failed most of the time. Normans, Saxons, Angs, Vikings, etc... Had plenty of fun walking ashore old england.

And in the nine centuries since then, no one has.

Summary remains the same, Sealion simply needed a little time to figure a safe landing plan.

That landing plan has a name. Operation Neptune. The Germans didn't have the resources to carry it out.

The reason Gernany lost the war was the was operation Barbrosa, they may have beaten the british army but holding it would have been diffecult. Still the million odd soldiers they sent into the meat grinder of russia would have been tough for GB to resist without outside help. Not impossible but protracted geurilla warfare would've been the game to play and keep german forces tied up while the rest of the empire troops sorted themselves out.

colmquinn wrote:The reason Gernany lost the war was the was operation Barbrosa

Barbarossa certainly speeded things up, but against an unassailable allied base of operations in the UK and the resources of the US Germany was always going to lose.

Still the million odd soldiers they sent into the meat grinder of russia would have been tough for GB to resist without outside help.

They would have been easy for the UK to resist - there's no way they could have got an army across the Channel. Look at the scale of Operation Overlord, and try imagining the Germans doing the same with no strategic bombers, no long-range escort fighters, a navy a fraction of the size of the bombardment fleet, no Resistance causing chaos in the rear areas and unable to decode the enemy's messages. Trying it would have been a catastrophe.

Took some time to review what books I have on hand. While Seafort is of the opinion that the Germans were unable to move across the channel, the transports viewed seem fully able to move armor cross-channel. Military History Channel spoke on Operation Sealion earlier today, and the common belief I saw from German, British and American sources on screen believe that it wasn't that an inablilty of the Germans to cross the channel. In fact, it was believed that the Germans could move a full 16 divisions across the channel for an invasion. While this is nothing next to the allied invasion of Normandy. Its more then enough to engage the British forces while still on their own. The deciding factor that the Historians seemed to agree on wasn't due to naval or ground ability but air power. Hitler lost his ground by ordering the attacks over Britain to be focused on civilian targets rather then military targets. Without airsuperiority, Sealion was a no go. The view of the Historians, and Churchill as it seems, was that the RN/RAF would be unable to resist the combined power of the German air and naval power if the Channel was to be contested.

Captain Seafort wrote:Barbarossa certainly speeded things up, but against an unassailable allied base of operations in the UK and the resources of the US Germany was always going to lose.

From what I'm seeing, England was hardly unassailable. In fact if Hitler had directed his efforts more against the RAF rather then just trying to kill civilians. An invasion would have been fully possible and likely. Also recall that the US was sometime out from joining the war, as at the time the US didn't want to be drawn into another WWI issue.

Captain Seafort wrote:They would have been easy for the UK to resist - there's no way they could have got an army across the Channel. Look at the scale of Operation Overlord, and try imagining the Germans doing the same with no strategic bombers, no long-range escort fighters, a navy a fraction of the size of the bombardment fleet, no Resistance causing chaos in the rear areas and unable to decode the enemy's messages. Trying it would have been a catastrophe.

Seems rather clear that if the Germans had focused on defeating the RAF rather then killing civilians, they could have crossed the Channel pretty easily.

Deepcrush wrote:the transports viewed seem fully able to move armor cross-channel

Have you read any of what I wrote about what they were intending to do? The barges were unseaworthy at best, and even if they'd got across, the tactic of blowing the bows off would have prevented them from sailing back for the supplies they needed.

In fact, it was believed that the Germans could move a full 16 divisions across the channel for an invasion. While this is nothing next to the allied invasion of Normandy. Its more then enough to engage the British forces while still on their own.

1. That's far more than the allies shipped across - Overlord was five infantry and three airborne divisions.
2. Sure, if the Channel had miraculously dried up so the Germans could cross, they would have beaten the forces Britain had on hand.
3. The Germans might have planned to ship 16 divisions across, but for the reasons I've explained they never had a hope of accomplishing it.

The view of the Historians, and Churchill as it seems, was that the RN/RAF would be unable to resist the combined power of the German air and naval power if the Channel was to be contested.

Churchill can be forgiven for thinking that, given that he didn't have access to the detailed operation plans for Sealion. These so-called "historians" have so such excuse for such incompetence.

Seems rather clear that if the Germans had focused on defeating the RAF rather then killing civilians, they could have crossed the Channel pretty easily.

Not a chance. They could, with the right tactics, have forced the RAF to withdraw north of the Thames, but once that had been done they would have been utterly incapable of doing any serious damage - they would have been out of range of fighter escorts and unescorted bombers would have done nothing but allow the RAF to rack up lots of kills. As soon as the invasion started, the RAF would have come south again, and either slaughtered the invasion force themselves, or kept the Luftwaffe busy so the Roual Navy could do the job.

Captain Seafort wrote:Have you read any of what I wrote about what they were intending to do? The barges were unseaworthy at best, and even if they'd got across, the tactic of blowing the bows off would have prevented them from sailing back for the supplies they needed.

I did read that, and I had the chance to view some of the barges they used to carry materials from Germany to Finland which worked perfectly fine. None of which involved blowing their bows off. They were simply shallow draft vessels with hill ramp bows. While by no means perfect, they weren't bad and were clearly able to transit the distance needed. Not once, in either the books I have or the three hours of TV covering Sealion, were bow blowing barges ever mentioned that I saw.

1. That's far more than the allies shipped across - Overlord was five infantry and three airborne divisions.

That was Overlords first wave, the opening assualt force. Not the total force.

2. Sure, if the Channel had miraculously dried up so the Germans could cross, they would have beaten the forces Britain had on hand.

Seeing how we have had boats for a few thousand years, the Channel being dry isn't needed.

3. The Germans might have planned to ship 16 divisions across, but for the reasons I've explained they never had a hope of accomplishing it.

The issues you have posted are part a logisitics issue which tends to be worked out and mostly your own ignorance and bias. Hardly anything worth considering when considering the ability of the Germans to make the crossing.

Churchill can be forgiven for thinking that, given that he didn't have access to the detailed operation plans for Sealion. These so-called "historians" have so such excuse for such incompetence.

What they have is greater information and still consider his views as correct. What you have is your belief that your ideas automatically over take reality. Again, experts vs your bias. I will gladly trust them.

Not a chance. They could, with the right tactics, have forced the RAF to withdraw north of the Thames, but once that had been done they would have been utterly incapable of doing any serious damage - they would have been out of range of fighter escorts and unescorted bombers would have done nothing but allow the RAF to rack up lots of kills. As soon as the invasion started, the RAF would have come south again, and either slaughtered the invasion force themselves, or kept the Luftwaffe busy so the Roual Navy could do the job.

Had the RAF withdrawn then they would have lost their primary advantage in the air battle over Britain, being fuel. They were close to the targets and there for had the ability to out last the Germans in the air. If the RAF had pulled back, then they would have been further away from the landing zones then the Germans and thus the air results would have been reversed and the Luftwaffe would have had the air advantage. The Royal Navy would then have been at the mercy of German air power. Again, your uneducated bias doesn't surpass historical fact.

Deepcrush wrote:I did read that, and I had the chance to view some of the barges they used to carry materials from Germany to Finland which worked perfectly fine. None of which involved blowing their bows off. They were simply shallow draft vessels with hill ramp bows. While by no means perfect, they weren't bad and were clearly able to transit the distance needed. Not once, in either the books I have or the three hours of TV covering Sealion, were bow blowing barges ever mentioned that I saw.

Well, now you have. Incidentally, I've never mentioned Baltic barges - the ones the Germans intended to use were Rhine barges, which were completely unsuitable for the Channel.

The issues you have posted are part a logisitics issue which tends to be worked out and mostly your own ignorance and bias. Hardly anything worth considering when considering the ability of the Germans to make the crossing.

I'm sure you've heard the saying about amateurs talking about strategy while professionals talk about logistics. The logistics of Sealion are the reason it never stood a chance of working.

What they have is greater information and still consider his views as correct. What you have is your belief that your ideas automatically over take reality.

They're obviously not using all the information available if they think Sealion is at all workable.

If the RAF had pulled back, then they would have been further away from the landing zones then the Germans and thus the air results would have been reversed and the Luftwaffe would have had the air advantage. The Royal Navy would then have been at the mercy of German air power. Again, your uneducated bias doesn't surpass historical fact.

Read what I wrote - the key bit being the statement that "the RAF would have come south again".

Captain Seafort wrote:Well, now you have. Incidentally, I've never mentioned Baltic barges - the ones the Germans intended to use were Rhine barges, which were completely unsuitable for the Channel.

Of course Rhine barges would have been only useful in aiding the British, by drowning Germans before they could land, however nothing that I've seen has ever paid any mention to the Rhine barges. Only the Baltic craft were mentioned.

I'm sure you've heard the saying about amateurs talking about strategy while professionals talk about logistics. The logistics of Sealion are the reason it never stood a chance of working.

Which is absolutely true, which is why Germany (more why Hitler) lost the war.

They're obviously not using all the information available if they think Sealion is at all workable.

Sealion was entirely workable... it would have failed in the long run, but the invasion of England is fully possible. Nothing was ever said that Germany would rule England, just that Germany would be able to invade England. An invasion being possible isn't the same as that same invasion being a success.

Read what I wrote - the key bit being the statement that "the RAF would have come south again".

Which would then put them back in range of Luftwaffe attacks. Any retreat north would have cleared the Channel airspace for the German invasion, which is why the RAF had to stay as far south as it did. The key to the invasion was the RAF. As long as the RAF survived, then the invasion wasn't possible. For a time, the RAF was breaking and then the Luftwaffe switched targets to British civilians. Which allowed the RAF time to rebuild and continue the draining of Luftwaffe pilots and planes.

Deepcrush wrote:Of course Rhine barges would have been only useful in aiding the British, by drowning Germans before they could land, however nothing that I've seen has ever paid any mention to the Rhine barges. Only the Baltic craft were mentioned.

I've always heard the reverse - and that the preparations caused serious damage to the German economy due to the reduced Rhine traffic.

Sealion was entirely workable... it would have failed in the long run, but the invasion of England is fully possible. Nothing was ever said that Germany would rule England, just that Germany would be able to invade England. An invasion being possible isn't the same as that same invasion being a success.

If by "invasion being possible", you mean the Germans could either a) float ashore face-down in large numbers, or b) dump lots of seasick POWs-in-waiting on the beach for the Home Guard and local police to collect, then I agree.

Which would then put them back in range of Luftwaffe attacks.

Sure, but they wouldn't have to be there very long - just long enough to block the invasion, and in such circumstances the long-term survival of 10 and 11 Groups would have been secondary to that objective.

As long as the RAF survived, then the invasion wasn't possible.

I agree with this bit, but I disagree with your idea that the RAF could have been defeated and with the idea that it was the sole deciding factor. Even the worst-case scenario of a strategic withdrawal to 12 Group would have retained a force in being to return south to counter the invasion if or when it happened. Even without the RAF, the RN could have done the job on its own by sailing destroyers up and down the Channel to swamp the barges. It would have been very costly, but achievable.

Captain Seafort wrote:I've always heard the reverse - and that the preparations caused serious damage to the German economy due to the reduced Rhine traffic.

Indeed, the use of the Rhine trasit craft would of course crush the German raw material economy. Without the craft the Rhineland would be at a near halt.

If by "invasion being possible", you mean the Germans could either a) float ashore face-down in large numbers, or b) dump lots of seasick POWs-in-waiting on the beach for the Home Guard and local police to collect, then I agree.

I mean by the points I provided, that the experts on the subject pointed to and by the information avalable. As I said, the ships and barges used in the North Sea and Baltic Sea would have been more then able to land troops and Armor ashore. The issue for the invasion is that as soon as said Armor moves more then 60 miles inland, they are now at the mid range of the RAF and thus targets for the RAF. This would have led to a cut off as soon as the US joined the war, a Dunkirk for the Germans. As the addition of US air forces (or even just US supplied aircraft) too the RAF would have easily destroyed any standing Armor.

Sure, but they wouldn't have to be there very long - just long enough to block the invasion, and in such circumstances the long-term survival of 10 and 11 Groups would have been secondary to that objective.

However as Dowding pointed out to Churchill, the survival of the RAF equaled the survival of England. With the US supplying the UK, Germany would sooner or later lose the logistical war. Even if England lost the whole of the RN, the RAF could be relied on to protect the shores and coasts of England as Germany lacked the naval forces required to out last the RAF in a protracted conflict.

I agree with this bit, but I disagree with your idea that the RAF could have been defeated and with the idea that it was the sole deciding factor. Even the worst-case scenario of a strategic withdrawal to 12 Group would have retained a force in being to return south to counter the invasion if or when it happened. Even without the RAF, the RN could have done the job on its own by sailing destroyers up and down the Channel to swamp the barges. It would have been very costly, but achievable.

I have to disagree that the RN could withstand the continued attack of the Luftwaffe in order to engage the German landing forces. Considering that the RN would have to start out of range of the Luftwaffe then attempt to close range and engage. The problem is simply that the Germans needed to clear the skies, even landing 140,000 troops is meaningless if the armor they bring with them is being slammed by 2000lbs bombs by the air. The key would be using the RN to block the future withdraw of German forces as they try to flee back across the Channel. After the Luftwaffe has been bled out and after the US is actively in the war. Also the cost to the RN to engage during the invasion rather then a year later would have been a waste of naval support that the UK didn't need to expend.