Materialism or Dualism

[Teaos]

OK, so we have "same" person but two different "meat" brains. Obviously, the existence of both nullifies any idea of numerical/physical identity, so such cannot be a determinant of true personal identity. Ergo, the idea of personal identity being bound up with physical/numerical identity falls down.

Why? If anything it proves our point. Double the meat double the brain, double the mind. Purely physical forces at play.

[IanKennedy]

I'm aware of that. However, I'm saying that the nature of quantum effects being involved makes any instinct about the situation less than helpful.

*sigh* I agree, and it's therefore a good thing that I never said anything like that. The "instinct in comment was strictly and expressly addressed toward epistemological views, not to any situation within the thought experiment.

Fair enough.

If you accept a perfect duplication, even for a plank time length then I can't see a problem with them being the same brain, much as the existing experiment of the 'transport' of the sub-atomic particle produced a duplicate. If the duplicate isn't good enough then they're not the same person and you have instead have a personality duplicator.

OK, so we have "same" person but two different "meat" brains. Obviously, the existence of both nullifies any idea of numerical/physical identity, so such cannot be a determinant of true personal identity. Ergo, the idea of personal identity being bound up with physical/numerical identity falls down.

No we don't we have the "same" person with the "same" meat, in every measurable way. I can't see the issue with that. Our contention is that the exact quantum state at an exact time produces or holds the identity of the person. The very fact that duplicating the 'meat' duplicates the person validates the idea that it's the meat that's important. After all that's how the machine is stated to work.

Clearly, if you found that the duplicated meat didn't reproduce the person that would mean the meat is not the key factor. Equally if you could reproduce the person without an exact copy of the meat it would also prove that the meat isn't key.

[Mikey]

No we don't we have the "same" person with the "same" meat, in every measurable way. I can't see the issue with that. Our contention is that the exact quantum state at an exact time produces or holds the identity of the person. The very fact that duplicating the 'meat' duplicates the person validates the idea that it's the meat that's important. After all that's how the machine is stated to work.

Clearly, if you found that the duplicated meat didn't reproduce the person that would mean the meat is not the key factor. Equally if you could reproduce the person without an exact copy of the meat it would also prove that the meat isn't key.

Why? If anything it proves our point. Double the meat double the brain, double the mind. Purely physical forces at play.

Obviously both of your comments presuppose the idea that you don't require numerical identity as a criterion for "true" personal identity. I'd be willing to listen to such a viewpoint as a valid one, but I'd have to hear some explanation. The uniqueness of identity is a fairly persistent, commonplace, and intrinsic tenet in the history of epistemology.