Is transportation death?

[Lazar]

Okay, here's a question. I invent a device that suspends time - stasis pod sort of deal, but it doesn't just freeze you or stop your metabolism, it actually suspends time. I put you in it and while it's on your atoms aren't moving, your brain is not functioning, your consciousness has utterly ceased.

Are you dead? When I turn it off and you wake up, are you a different person?

I would say that time is a dimension, and that there's no absolute "speed" of time, so there wouldn't be a discontinuity in consciousness. From your perspective outside the machine, there is an extended period during which I have stopped moving; but from my perspective inside the machine, I maintain uninterrupted consciousness and there is merely one instant when everyone outside moves infinitely fast.

On a more frivolous note, I've often thought that such a machine would be the perfect means of food preservation - it would be like... God's refrigerator.

[Mikey]

Seeing a person's own point of view during transport can't be evidence that consciousness continues throughout.

Imagine there are (for instance) 5 steps to transport and you remain conscious for 1 and 2, then stop being conscious for 3, then become conscious again for 4 and 5. From your own point of view you just went 1, 2, 4, 5 - with no gap in between.

Saavik would have started talking to Kirk, she would have talked through 1 and 2, then she would have stopped talking and Kirk would have stopped hearing her at 4, then everything would have resumed seamlessly for 5 and 6. Similarly everything Barclay experienced could have been during 1 and 2.


Okay, here's a question. I invent a device that suspends time - stasis pod sort of deal, but it doesn't just freeze you or stop your metabolism, it actually suspends time. I put you in it and while it's on your atoms aren't moving, your brain is not functioning, your consciousness has utterly ceased.

Are you dead? When I turn it off and you wake up, are you a different person?

I know you're trying to engender conversation, so sorry for the the short answer - but, no. You're not a different person. Both forms of continued identity are preserved: you come out of the device comprising the same physical components as you when you went in - same particles, etc. - so physical/numerical identity is preserved; similarly, you act the same way, have the same bases for your motivations, have the same engrams/neurotransmitter balances/etc, all in all have the same consciousness/personality/"soul" - so qualitative identity is likewise preserved. Since this scenario passes the identioty test on both available criteria, you remain the same person.

[Graham Kennedy]

from my perspective inside the machine, I maintain uninterrupted consciousness and there is merely one instant when everyone outside moves infinitely fast.

So you are saying that what matters is not that your consciousness remains continually active, but whether you perceive it as being continually active?

But perception is a function of consciousness. It's a logical impossibility to perceive yourself as having no consciousness. So on that basis, then the transporter certainly doesn't kill you, and in fact nothing has ever killed you so long as the same thought processes are eventually restored by some method.

On a more frivolous note, I've often thought that such a machine would be the perfect means of food preservation - it would be like... God's refrigerator.

I didn't originate the idea, I've seen it suggested in sci fi books as both a method of hibernation and indeed of food preservation. Niven suggested it as the ultimate safety system; turn it on just as your ship is about to ram into an asteroid, because nothing can harm anything inside the field.

[Mikey]

in fact nothing has ever killed you so long as the same thought processes are eventually restored by some method.

Which is basically a subjective way of describing qualitative identity, which I personally maintain is more important than numerical identity in the determination of continuity.

[Lazar]

So you are saying that what matters is not that your consciousness remains continually active, but whether you perceive it as being continually active?

Not quite that, because I could be a transporter clone and perceive a continuity of consciousness even if I had been killed and duplicated; what I mean is that inside the machine, I think my consciousness does remain continually active. As I said above, from your perspective outside the machine, you have stopped time; but from my perspective inside, there is an uninterrupted flow of time, with just one moment when everyone outside happens to move infinitely fast. In my frame of reference, there is no measurable stopping, slowing or discontinuity, so it's hard for me to imagine that there would be any existential problems for me. Obviously you've got most of the universe on your side, and I've just got the interior volume of the machine on my side, but fundamentally I don't see why one frame of reference is more correct or real than the other. My consciousness would have to be stopped in my own frame of reference, not in someone else's.

But perception is a function of consciousness. It's a logical impossibility to perceive yourself as having no consciousness. So on that basis, then the transporter certainly doesn't kill you, and in fact nothing has ever killed you so long as the same thought processes are eventually restored by some method.

But it's a question of the same thought processes, or duplicated thought processes. In the transporter death model, the transporter destroys you and creates a clone with all your memories up to that point - the clone thinks he's the same person; or rather, he's got the same personality and memories, but nonetheless the original you is dead. It's the same as if I created a perfect duplicate of you, but you remained alive: you and the duplicate wouldn't be the same person. (Of course I'm not certain enough about my knowledge of transportation technology or consciousness to know that this is, indeed, the case in Trek: I think it might be possible that the consciousness maintains continuity in the form of information even if the brain itself is destroyed and recreated.) I don't think that your time suspension machine is analogous to a transporter, for the reasons I gave above.

[Mikey]

even if I had been killed and duplicated

And I have argued, and buttressed, the idea that even in that case you remain.

[Lazar]

Which is basically a subjective way of describing qualitative identity, which I personally maintain is more important than numerical identity in the determination of continuity.

In the determination of continuity by external observers, yes. But I think that if you kill John Doe and create a duplicate of him, even one with identical traits and experiences, I think this numerical issue is very important for the original John Doe, because he's dead. (Not important for anyone else, but for him.) As an external observer, you think they look like the same person, so they must be the same person; but you never knew for certain that John Doe had a consciousness in the first place; only he himself could be sure of that. You only assumed that he had a consciousness based on imperfect observational data. What if there are multiple John Does alive, but I keep all of them hidden from you but one? Again, you think there's no change in John's identity, but in reality poor old John and 10 of his duplicates are sequestered somewhere. And to continue the example, what's the difference from the original John's point of view if he dies 50 years after the duplicates are created, or 1 millisecond after they're created, or at the same time that they're created? Not from your point of view, but from his.

And I have argued, and buttressed, the idea that even in that case you remain.

You think I remain. You're privileging the external observer as the one with the ability to determine continuity of consciousness, but I'm saying that the only person with direct knowledge of a person's consciousness is the person himself.

[Mikey]

You actually bring up two different questions. #1 - does numerical identity matter to the individual for determinging continuity, over qualitative identity? I would say that if the individual experiences continuation of consciousness, even in a numerically different body, then no.

#2 - Should the individual care about numerical identity? In other words, if I'm in a transporter situation in which my numerical dentity is discontinued, but my qualitative identity is continued, why should I care? From my point of view, having a numerically disparate but qualitatively identical "duplicate" is just as good as numerical continuity.

[Lazar]

You actually bring up two different questions. #1 - does numerical identity matter to the individual for determinging continuity, over qualitative identity? I would say that if the individual experiences continuation of consciousness, even in a numerically different body, then no.

But what if there are 10 duplicates who all think they experience continuation of consciousness?

#2 - Should the individual care about numerical identity? In other words, if I'm in a transporter situation in which my numerical dentity is discontinued, but my qualitative identity is continued, why should I care? From my point of view, having a numerically disparate but qualitatively identical "duplicate" is just as good as numerical continuity.

But my concern is that if I went into such a transporter, it would just be the same as killing me, and my consciousness as I know it would simply end. I'd either go to some afterlife or merely cease to be, regardless of what kinds of duplication were performed. It wouldn't matter to any external observer, and it wouldn't matter to my post-transportation duplicate, but my concern is that from my perspective before the transport, looking forward, I would just end up dead.

[Mikey]

But what if there are 10 duplicates who all think they experience continuation of consciousness?

As I said earlier concerning another scenario: once the primary criterion fails to distinguish - that is, when qualitative identity fails to prove continuity - then you move on to testing through numerical/physical identity.

But my concern is that if I went into such a transporter, it would just be the same as killing me, and my consciousness as I know it would simply end.

Your consciousness wouldn't end - you have a double with the same personality afterwards. But either way, the point of question #2 is that yes, you may call it "killing you" - but does that matter? Isn't have an exact duplicate with your consciousness just as good?

[Lazar]

As I said earlier concerning another scenario: once the primary criterion fails to distinguish - that is, when qualitative identity fails to prove continuity - then you move on to testing through numerical/physical identity.

But again, this is purely from the perspective of the external observer. You're looking at the available evidence and going through a checklist of criteria to try to prove continuity. That's not the same as actually being the person and experiencing what they experience from a forward-looking perspective. My view is that each consciousness is like a universe unto itself: I'm the only person who knows what it's like to be me, and I'll never know what it's like to be anyone else. From my perspective, I fall into the category of the self, and everyone else falls into the category of observational data, guesses, assumptions, extrapolations. What's good enough for the external observer may not be good enough for the self.

Your consciousness wouldn't end - you have a double with the same personality afterwards. But either way, the point of question #2 is that yes, you may call it "killing you" - but does that matter? Isn't have an exact duplicate with your consciousness just as good?

It matters because I'm dead. My experience as a human being ceases, and whatever happens to people when they die happens to me. Whether there's a person going around who looks like me, and thinks he's me, isn't relevant to me. He might as well be a clone who's been duped into thinking he's me.

And I keep thinking about all these different absurd situations: What if the duplicate is created, and then I die after a delay? What if I die, and then my duplicate is created after a delay? What are the implications for consciousness?

[Mikey]

But again, this is purely from the perspective of the external observer. You're looking at the available evidence and going through a checklist of criteria to try to prove continuity. That's not the same as actually being the person and experiencing what they experience from a forward-looking perspective. My view is that each consciousness is like a universe unto itself: I'm the only person who knows what it's like to be me, and I'll never know what it's like to be anyone else. From my perspective, I fall into the category of the self, and everyone else falls into the category of observational data, guesses, assumptions, extrapolations. What's good enough for the external observer may not be good enough for the self.

Merely a matter of viewpoint. All the ideas about "only I can live through my own experiences," etc., are simply ongoing tests of that selfsame identity - just tests made from a different perspective. I'll definitely agree that the same results can mean a pass to one observer and a fail to another (including when that observer is the "self" in question.)

It matters because I'm dead. My experience as a human being ceases, and whatever happens to people when they die happens to me. Whether there's a person going around who looks like me, and thinks he's me, isn't relevant to me. He might as well be a clone who's been duped into thinking he's me.

And I keep thinking about all these different absurd situations: What if the duplicate is created, and then I die after a delay? What if I die, and then my duplicate is created after a delay? What are the implications for consciousness?

All this is to say that you believe that numerical identity is as, or more, important to you than qualitative identity. That's fine - I'm not here to argue which is superior.