Is transportation death?

[Lazar]

Except we're not talking about moving a few atoms. We're talking about moving a person in their entirety, KNOWING the position, velocity, acceleration, rotation, etc. of every single subatomic particle in their body. Tearing them apart into those building blocks then reassembling them remotely. To top it off you don't just get the physical stuff from point A to B, you manage to transfer their consciousness as well after their bodies are torn into quintillions of separate pieces.

It's just a little bit different.

I agree; I think the ST transporter is so implausible as to basically just be magical. (I have to say, I loved Mike Okuda's answer when someone asked him how the infamous Heisenberg compensator worked: "Very well, thank you.") I do find the consciousness thing troubling: the transporter breaks you into quintillions of pieces and then makes a copy of you using the same matter; wouldn't this be pretty much the same as killing you and then making a clone? Is it really the same consciousness?

[Sionnach Glic]

We actualy had a pretty lengthy debate on that subject a year or two ago. Can't remember what the concensus was at the end, though.

[Nickswitz]

There wasn't a consensus, it was a draw really.

[Graham Kennedy]

For me, I say I'm gonna wait until somebody can definitively tell me what consciousness IS before I worry about it.

One thing Enterprise did though, was have an episode with the inventor of the transporter where he basically laughed at that precise idea and said people had worried about it when he invented the thing but they got over it.

And really... what would be the difference? Suppose it is a copy and the real you died. The copy would never know it, so what ultimate difference does it make, really?

[Captain Seafort]

We actualy had a pretty lengthy debate on that subject a year or two ago. Can't remember what the concensus was at the end, though.

As Nick said, eventually everyone got tired of arguing and gave up. That was one of the DITL Classics though - if we ever put together a list of the greatest debates we've had that will be one of them, and one of the few that didn't end up as a full-scale flamewar.

[Mikey]

At issue is, I think, the idea of qualitative identity vs. that of numerical identity. I guess the matter boils down to what the subject feels is more important in determining "real" identity.

And as to the OP, I'd have to agree with the staggering number of displays of convergent evolution, even with wildly differing environmental pressures.

[Sionnach Glic]

Ultimately? Nothing.
To you? Quite a lot if it killed you.

[Lazar]

Has anybody got a link to the debate?

[Mikey]

Ultimately? Nothing.
To you? Quite a lot if it killed you.

Not at all. We're presupposing that a transporter-simulacrum exists; if I believed that qualitative identity, rather than numerical, was the determinant of continued identity, the death of the prime body would be next to meaningless.

[Captain Seafort]

Ask and you shall receive.

[Mikey]

Good times.

[Captain Seafort]

Not at all. We're presupposing that a transporter-simulacrum exists; if I believed that qualitative identity, rather than numerical, was the determinant of continued identity, the death of the prime body would be next to meaningless.

A question for you then - if someone chucked your wedding ring into the sea, and then gave you an identical ring, would that mean you still had your ring?

[Mikey]

As I responded to your similar question in the original debate, epistemological issues don't apply to inanimate objects. No, I wouldn't, as there is no consciousness or personal identity to continue other than simple numerical identity. If someone chucked yours into the sea and replaced it with a duplicate - and you didn't know about it - would you think they were one and the same ring? Yes.

[Tyyr]

If someone chucked yours into the sea and replaced it with a duplicate - and you didn't know about it - would you think they were one and the same ring? Yes.

I think that's the key. Tell someone that they just died once they finish rematerializing. Their response? "No I didn't." Why? Because from their POV they are still them, same body, memories, thoughts, etc. From your standpoint the person in front of you is the same person as far as you can determine. Neither of you can disprove that the person standing in front of you is the person who stepped onto the transporter pad moments before. From those frames of reference the consciousness can be transferred no problem.

Now there might be 10,000 copies of Riker standing at the Pearly Gates cursing the guy who invented the transporter but there's no way you can ever prove that objectively.

[Lighthawk]

Bring religion into the equation though. If the transporter does kill you and replace you with a duplicate that thinks it's the real you, then what you have is a bunch of souless clones wandering about.